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Abstract 
This paper studies the contribution of parental influence in accounting for cross-country gaps in human capital 
achievements. We argue that the cross-country variation in unobserved parental characteristics is at least as 
important as the one in commonly used observable proxies of parental socio-economic background. We infer 
this through an indirect empirical approach, based on the comparison of the school performance of second-
generation immigrants. We document that, within the same host country or even the same school, students 
whose parents come from high-scoring countries in the PISA test do better than their peers with similar socio-
economic backgrounds. Differential selection into emigration does not explain this finding. The result is larger 
when parents have little education and have recently emigrated, suggesting the importance of country-specific 
cultural traits that parents progressively lose as they integrate in the new host country, rather than of an 
intergenerational transmission of education quality. Unobserved parental characteristics account for about 15% 
of the cross-country variance in test scores, roughly doubling the overall contribution of parental influence. 
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1 Introduction
Human capital varies greatly across countries, in terms of both years of schooling and results
in international standardized tests. East Asian countries consistently position themselves at
the top of international test rankings, while several Southern European and Latin American
countries perform poorly. An emerging strand of the growth literature argues that human
capital accounts for a substantial part of cross-country differences in economic performance
(Schoellman, 2012; Jones, 2014; Lagakos et al., 2016), especially when measured by standardized
tests (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012a).
Given the role that gaps in human capital measures play in the academic and policy de-
bates, it is important to understand where they come from. Previous research analyzes the
role of educational systems and parental socio-economic background for cross-country gaps in
standardized test scores, finding that both aspects play some role. Such analyses, however, face
the challenge that countries may differ in a range of factors, related to both the institutional
setting and the cultural traits, preferences and skills transmitted by parents, which are difficult
to fully capture through the observable characteristics commonly available for cross-country
comparisons.
This paper investigates the importance of parental influence for the cross-country variation
in test scores. We start from a simple educational production function framework, along the
lines of Woessmann (2016), relating individual-level educational performance to several observ-
able student, household, country and school characteristics. We show that, when the effect
of proxies for parental socio-economic status is estimated exploiting within country (or within
school) variation only, cross-country differences in those characteristics account for a relatively
limited part of the cross-country variation in average performance. However, studies on skill
formation at the individual level suggest that parents influence children’s human capital through
a number of channels not fully captured by socio-economic characteristics, including parenting
styles (Cobb-Clark et al., 2016; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017), features of the home environment
(Todd and Wolpin, 2007; Almond and Currie, 2011) and the transmission of preferences and
cultural traits (Bisin and Verdier, 2010; Figlio et al., 2016). A natural question then is whether
the variation in these factors is relevant also at the country level.1
Motivated by this question, we propose an empirical strategy to infer the importance of cross-
country gaps in unobserved parental characteristics. Our approach is based on the analysis of
second-generation immigrant students. We compare the educational performance of students
born in the same country and, for part of the analysis, educated in the same school, with a similar
socio-economic background but with parents of different nationalities. In absence of differential
selection into migration (which we discuss below), we propose to use performance gaps across
parental nationalities for otherwise similar second-generation immigrants as proxies for cross-
country gaps in an unobservable parental component. The logic is simple: these students are
1Anecdotal evidence suggests that indeed parenting styles and parental attitudes towards education vary
across countries; for example, the international bestseller by Chua (2011) coined the expression “Tiger Mother”
to describe demanding Asian mothers, focusing on their children’s academic excellence.
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all exposed to the same (host country) educational system and institutional environment, but
their parents plausibly embody some of the parental attitudes, practices and skills typical of
their country of origin. To quantify the importance of this unobserved parental component, we
augment the baseline educational production function specification with country-of-origin fixed
effects, identified from the gaps in performance between second-generation immigrant students
(observed in the same country or school), and compare their cross-country variation with the
overall variation in average performance.
Our results point towards a substantial role for unobserved parental characteristics. First,
we document that the PISA performance of second-generation immigrant pupils, living in the
same country and studying in the same school, is closely related to the one of natives from
the country of origin of their parents: the best performing second-generation immigrants are
those whose parents come from countries where natives are particularly successful in standard-
ized tests.2 This holds true when controlling for proxies of parents’ socio-economic status and
other characteristics of their countries of origin. We analyze patterns of migrants’ selection on
observable characteristics, and conclude that these findings do not appear to be driven by a
differential selection into emigration. Moreover, we find a similar result for a different schooling
outcome in a specific host country, which is grade repetition in the United States.
The inferred cross-country variation in parental influence is substantial. The estimated
parental country-of-origin fixed effects account for about 15% of the cross-country variation in
test performance, roughly doubling the overall contribution of parental influence. The unob-
served parental component is a key driver of the high performance of East Asian countries, as
well as of the relatively low performance of Southern European countries. Overall, a narrow
focus on observable socio-economic characteristics substantially underestimates the importance
of parents for cross-country gaps in human capital.
We then focus on the US data to explore potential mechanisms behind gaps in this parental
unobservable component. We show that the relationship between the performance of second-
generation immigrants and the average score in the parents’ country of origin is strongest for
parents with little or no formal education. This suggests that our results are not driven by
the intergenerational transmission of the quality of education received by parents in their home
country. Moreover, the relationship is weaker for parents that have spent more years in the
host country, which is consistent with the importance of country-specific “cultural” traits, that
are progressively lost by emigrants as they integrate in their new host country. Consistently
with this interpretation, part of the variation in second-generation immigrants’ performance is
accounted for by differences across parental nationalities in proxies for cultural traits likely to
be conducive to human capital investment, such as long-term orientation, locus of control and
attitudes towards leisure. Finally, we rely on time use data for US immigrants to document
actual parental practices that might contribute to our results, and we show that parents from
2Throughout the paper, we call natives those students born in the country where they are taking the test
and whose parents are born in the same country as well. On average, across countries participating to the PISA
test, natives represent 77% of the target population. Students born in a country different from the one where
they are taking the test are excluded from the analysis.
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high PISA countries spend more time on various forms of child care.
This paper contributes to the debate on cross-country differences in human capital. Our
analysis is similar in spirit to Woessmann (2016), which relates standardized test performances
across countries to observable characteristics of the educational systems and students’ family
background. Specific evidence for the importance of international differences in school quality
is provided by, among others, Singh (2017). More broadly, the literature on cross-country
differences in educational attainment emphasizes country-specific factors such as technology and
relative prices that shape the costs and expected benefits of human capital investments (Bils
and Klenow, 2000; Manuelli and Seshadri, 2014). Our focus on parents is shared by Doepke and
Zilibotti (2017), who develop a model of preference transmission to explain the international
variation in parenting styles as a function of local economic conditions.3 We contribute to
this literature by quantifying and characterizing cross-country differences in observable and
unobservable parental influence.
We also relate to a wide literature across economics and sociology on the school perfor-
mance of first- and second-generation immigrant children (see Levels et al., 2008; Dustmann et
al., 2012, for broad reviews). Differently from these papers, our objective is to understand gaps
in performance between natives of different nationalities, and our focus on second-generation
immigrants is mostly instrumental in that it provides us with an empirical strategy to discrim-
inate between possible sources for these gaps.4 In addition, we conduct our analysis on a broad
sample of host and origin countries (while, for example, Dustmann et al. (2012) focus on Turkish
immigrants, and Jerrim (2015) on East Asian immigrants), and we rely on several additional
sources to provide evidence on the mechanisms underlying our results.
Our paper shares the approach of a large literature that looks at first- and second-generation
immigrants to identify the importance of “portable” cultural traits for various outcomes (the
so-called “epidemiological approach”; see among others Giuliano, 2007; Fernandez and Fogli,
2009; Fernandez, 2011). Differently from these papers, we study the school performance of the
second generation, and use the results to quantify the importance of parents for cross-country
differences in the same outcome. While most of the focus in this literature is on immigrants
in the US, our sample includes a large set of both host and source countries, allowing us to
exploit variation in both dimensions. In more recent and independent work, Figlio et al. (2016)
adopt a similar methodology to document the relevance of long-term orientation for educational
performance. Compared to their paper, our aim is to study and quantify the overall importance
of observable and unobservable parental characteristics for the cross-country variation in human
3As mentioned above, the focus on parents is motivated by a growing micro-level literature emphasizing the
importance of various types of parental inputs for skill formation (see Heckman and Mosso (2014) for an extensive
review).
4Most papers have focused on the comparison between immigrants and natives in the host country. Like us,
Levels et al. (2008) and Dronkers and de Heus (2016) compare the performance of (a combination of) first- and
second-generation immigrants across countries of origin. However, they do not relate those to the performances
of natives in the countries of origin, nor explore the implications in terms of cross-country gaps in performance.
Yet another distinct strategy is the one in Borjas (1992), who relates the average educational attainment of ethnic
groups residing in the US (what he calls “ethnic capital”) to schooling and wages of the following generation. We
discuss this and other channels through which immigrant parents’ ethnic network might affect children’s human
capital accumulation in Appendix D.
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capital achievements, without restricting attention to a specific cultural trait.5
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data, while Section 3 quantifies
the role of observable parental characteristics for cross-country gaps in performance. Section 4
introduces the idea of using second generation immigrants to capture cross-country differences
in unobserved parental characteristics, shows evidence on their performance and addresses se-
lection into emigration. Section 5 augments the decomposition exercise of Section 3 with an
explicit role for parental unobservables. Finally, Section 6 explores the mechanisms behind our
results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
Our main data come from the 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015 waves of the PISA test. PISA
is a triennial survey of the knowledge and skills of 15-year-old children, explicitly designed to
allow comparisons across countries. The test covers three subjects: reading, mathematics and
science. We standardize scores to have mean 0 and individual-level standard deviation 1 across
all countries (pooled, equally weighted) participating in at least one wave of the test.6
Results for all subjects vary greatly across countries. Figure 1 shows the average math
score of native students for all countries that participated to at least one wave of the PISA test
(pooled across all available waves). Students in Shanghai score more than one (individual-level)
standard deviation higher than the average, and almost three standard deviations better than
the worst-performing countries.7 These magnitudes are striking; according to OECD (2012a),
a gap of 0.4 on this scale corresponds to what is learned in an average year of schooling.
There is substantial geographical clustering: East Asian countries occupy the first positions
of the ranking, followed by several Western European countries; Southern European countries
concentrate in the middle of the distribution, while Latin American countries are below the
average. The superior performance of East Asian students is stronger in mathematics, but the
ranking across regions is quite stable across subjects (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for the
average scores in these and other broadly defined regions).
A Student Questionnaire provides basic demographic and socio-economic information on
students and parents, including their country of birth, education, language spoken at home,
number of books at home, employment and the ISEI index of socioeconomic status.8
5In Section 6 we do look explicitly at long-term orientation, among other cultural traits, and confirm the
Figlio et al. (2016)’s result that it affects students’ performance, even though it cannot account for the whole
cross-country variation in parental influence.
6The results are not presented as point estimates but rather as “plausible values”: the OECD estimates
for each student a probability distribution of scores, and randomly draws from it five values. Following OECD
(2009), we compute variances of all functions of test scores as the average of the 5 variances estimated with each
set of plausible values, and standard deviations as the square root of the corresponding quantities.
7Within China, the PISA test was held in Shanghai only for the 2009 and 2012 waves, and in the provinces
of Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Guangdong for the 2015 wave. In the rest of the paper we refer to “China” as
the latter aggregation of provinces.
8The ISEI index, developed by Ganzeboom et al. (1992), is a measure of occupational status that assigns
5
Our second source is the US Census, which we use to explore the mechanisms behind our
results. We use the 1% sample for 1970 and 5% sample for 1980. We follow Oreopoulos and Page
(2006) in combining information on children’s age and grade currently attended to construct an
indicator of whether or not students have repeated any grade.9 We classify a child as a repeater
if his or her educational attainment is below the mode for the corresponding state, age, quarter
of birth, and census year cell.10 We focus on children between the ages of 8 and 15.
We use the 2002 to 2015 waves of the ATUS-US Time Use Survey to analyze how parents
spend their time. The survey is administered to one person per household, chosen randomly
among all individuals at least 15 years old. We compute the total time (in minutes) spent on
child care on the previous day, and, following Aguiar and Hurst (2007), three subcategories that
split total child care in educational, recreational and basic activities.
Finally, we rely on several other sources to construct controls at the host country, school,
and parents’ country of origin level. We discuss the details below as we introduce these variables
to the analysis.
3 The Role of Parental Observable Characteristics
This section presents a simple decomposition to quantify the role of parents’ observable char-
acteristics for cross-country gaps in PISA performance. We rely on an international education
production function, a regression model that relates individual-level test performance across
several countries to various relevant factors. Similar specifications have been widely employed
in the literature - for a recent review, see Woessmann (2016). We will discuss the role of
unobservable parental characteristics in the following sections.
Let Ticst be the test score in wave t of student i, born in country c and educated in school s.
We distinguish between two factors driving test scores: the effect of characteristics of parents and
the home environment on one hand, Parentsicst, and the effect of the resources and institutional
features of the educational system on the other, EduSystemcst. Moreover, we control for a
vector of basic students’ demographic characteristics, Dicst, which includes age (in months) and
gender. We assume the linear relationship11
Ticst “ Parentsicst ` EduSystemcst ` β
1Dicst ` αt ` εicst (1)
where αt is a wave fixed effect, and εicst a mean zero idyosincratic term.
We experiment with different approaches to capture EduSystemcst. First, we control for a
vector of observable characteristics of schools and countries’ educational environments, based
on Woessmann (2016). This vector includes both proxies for the amount of available resources,
to each occupation a score from 16 to 90 combining information on average income and education of full-time
employed men across several countries.
9Current grade is only available until 1980, which prevents us from using more recent years.
10This grade-for-age measure induces some misclassification, as, for example, students entering school late will
be classified as grade repeaters. As discussed in Cascio (2005), this type of misclassification will lead to some
attenuation bias in all regressions using the grade repetition proxy as outcome variable.
11Non-linear extensions are discussed in Appendix E. We find no evidence for significant interaction effects.
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such as expenditure per student and school-level indicators on the shortage of instructional
material, and institutional features of the educational system, such as various proxies for the
degrees of accountability, monitoring and autonomy in schools.12 These observables are available
for a sample of 37 countries. Second, we control for (wave-specific) country or school fixed
effects. This allows to control flexibly for any relevant difference in educational quality and
in the institutional context, and to extend the analysis to countries for which the observables
described above are not available.
School fixed effects (and, to some extent, school observable characteristics) absorb the within
country variation in school quality. Of course, parents play an important role in school selec-
tion, and one might want to ascribe an higher “demand” for better schools to the parental
factor. However, if parents are not completely free to choose schools, or if the supply of school
quality is to some extent fixed, a higher average demand for good schools would not by itself
raise the average performance. We display results from both country and school fixed effects
specifications, with the understanding that controlling for school fixed effects provides us with
a lower bound for the importance of parental influence for cross-country gaps in performance.13
The parental term is given by the sum of the effects of observable socio-economic character-
istics, collected in the vector Xicst, and an unobservable term, uicst
Parentsicst “ ρ
1Xicst ` uicst
We include in Xicst controls for parents’ education, employment and occupational status, as well
as for the number of books at home and a dummy identifying households where the primary
spoken language is not the one of the test.14 This selection follows closely previous work
on educational production functions estimated on PISA data.15 For now, we treat uicst as a
residual, implying that part of its effect might be absorbed by other regressors. In particular,
any systematic cross-country variation in the average of any relevant unobservable would be
absorbed by country or school fixed effects, if included in the regressions. In the following
sections, we propose an approach to separately identify this variation.
We estimate equation 1 using the micro-level data from the PISA assessment; we focus on
the math test in the main body of the paper, and illustrate the (similar) results for reading
and science in the Appendix. Table 1 shows the individual-level regression results. Column 1
only includes parental and demographic characteristics, while Column 2 introduces observable
controls for features of schools and the educational system. Columns 3 and 4 control for country
fixed effects, and columns 5 and 6 for school fixed effects. As mentioned, the fixed effects
12See Appendix A for a full list of the included variables and their sources.
13Moreover parents may also shape the characteristics and the quality of the educational system itself. What
we estimate in our analysis is the part of the parental component independent of potential impacts that parents
might have on the education system. If anything, this likely implies that we are underestimating the role of
cross-country differences in parental influence.
14Information on parental age and number of siblings is available only for a small set of host countries and
waves. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these controls in this sub-sample.
15In Appendix B we show that the results are robust to alternative controls for socio-economic status available
in the PISA dataset.
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specifications allow us to extend the analysis to a wider sample (79 countries); the corresponding
results are shown in Column 4 and 6.
Across specifications, several parental and home background characteristics are statistically
significant predictors of students’ performance in the expected direction. While the number of
books at home and occupational status are significant throughout, for several parental charac-
teristics the inclusion of country and, especially, school fixed effects causes a reduction in the
magnitude of the associated coefficients. This points to the fact that parental observables are
correlated with relevant country and school characteristics.16
The average score (across all available waves) of students in country c is
Tc “ ρ
1Xc ` uc ` EduSystemc ` β
1Dc ` αc (2)
where Xc, uc, EduSystemc, Dc and αc are country-level averages of the corresponding
variables (pooled across waves).17 Let’s denote the estimated effect of parental observables as
{ParentsObsc “ pρ
1Xc
where pρ is estimated according to the different individual-level specifications displayed in Table
1.
The cross-country variance of Tc can be additively decomposed in the contributions of the
covariances between Tc and all terms on the right hand side of equation 2. We quantify the
contribution of parental observables by computing
Covp {ParentsObsc, Tcq
VarpTcq
Table 2 shows the decomposition results. Each column corresponds to the specification
estimated in the corresponding column of Table 1. When no other controls are included, parental
observable characteristics account for about 43% of the overall cross country variation (column
1), while once educational quality is controlled for through observables this share of variance
almost halves (similarly to what reported in Woessmann (2016)). Country and, especially,
school fixed effects further reduce the contribution of parental observables, to 25% and 13%
when using the same sample of 37 countries with all educational system controls available, and
to 16% and 9% when using the full sample.18
16The coefficients on school and country observable characteristics included in the specification in column 2
are roughly comparable to what has been found in previous work (for a smaller set of countries and waves). The
main exceptions are that we do not find a positive impact for various indicators of accountability and monitoring
that emerge as important in Woessmann (2016). The discrepancy is mostly due to the different sample coverage
in terms of countries and waves. Given that the rest of the paper focuses on the fixed effects specifications, we
leave more detailled comparisons of these results for future work.
17The average of the wave fixed effects is country-specific as different countries participated in different waves.
The variation in this term plays virtually no role for the overall cross-country variation in Tc.
18The difference across samples is driven by the fact that the average PISA score has a larger variance and
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Overall, while the exact magnitudes depend on the sample of countries under consideration,
parental observable characteristics account for a minority share of the cross-country variation in
performance. However, these observables might fail to capture relevant channels through which
parents affect human capital accumulation, and as a result might underestimate the overall
importance of parental influence for cross-country gaps. We investigate this possibility in the
rest of the paper.
4 Second Generation Immigrants: Motivating Evidence
We argue that second generation immigrants represent an interesting laboratory to study cross-
country differences in parental influence. This is based on two premises. First, students born
and raised in the same country, educated in the same school and with parents with similar socio-
economic characteristics are subject to similiar conditions in terms of the educational system
and any other country-specific relevant factor. Second, part of any systematic difference across
countries in parental practices and (unobservable) parental characteristics should be preserved
across countries of origin of immigrant parents, and therefore be reflected in the educational
performance of second generation immigrants.19
These two points are subject to some caveats. Emigrant parents might be systematically
different from non-emigrant parents, and differences in performance across parental nationalities
might be due to differences in the degree of emigrants’ selection. Moreover, immigrant parents
might face frictions in terms of cultural assimilation, language and various types of discrimina-
tion, and once again the severity of those frictions might vary depending on countries of origin,
even for otherwise observationally equivalent parents. We acknowledge these possibilities and
discuss their empirical relevance for our results in Section 4.3.
Concerns on selection notwithstanding, if unobserved parental factors are important drivers
of cross-country differences in test performance, then we should expect, controlling for host-
country and school fixed effects as well as for parental socio-economic characteristics, second
generation immigrants from high-scoring countries to do better than those from low-scoring
countries, exactly because of the unobserved parental component uc postulated above. This is
the hypothesis we test in the next two subsections. Using both PISA and US Census data, we
relate the educational performance of second generation immigrant students to the average PISA
a smaller covariance with {ParentsObsc in the full sample. The smaller covariance is in turn explained by a
smaller variability in average parental characteristics in the full sample, while the difference across sample in the
associated coefficients has a negligible impact.
19Of course parental choices are likely to be partially driven by context-specific incentives: for example, higher
expected returns to skills in the labour market might induce parents to stress the importance of education and
hard work (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017). Immigrant parents in our sample arguably experience similar context-
specific incentives, since their children face the same educational system and, ruling out differential intentions in
terms of future relocation, labor markets with similar characteristics. Comparing second generation immigrants
instead isolates the role of factors that are embedded into parents, independently of the context-specific incentives
they face. We discuss and attempt to discriminate between some of these factors in Section 6.
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performance in parents’ country of origin, conditional on controls for socio-economic status and
school or educational system characteristics.
We focus here on second-generation immigrants on the mother’s side only. This is only
to simplify the exposition, and in Appendix B we show that results hold without exception
when we look at second-generation immigrants on the father’s side or at the whole sample of
second-generation immigrants and natives. We present results for the PISA and the US Census
samples in turn.
4.1 Evidence Using PISA Data
The PISA sample includes 49,097 second-generation immigrants on the mother’s side and 48,834
on the father’s side, from 59 and 58 different countries of origin and distributed across 39 host
countries.20 Sample sizes vary greatly, and for some countries of origin we have only a few
parents to work with (see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix for summary statistics by
origin and host country). To account for this, we weight countries of origin by the number
of second-generation immigrants in the sample when considering cross-country patterns, and
we present country-specific estimates for a “core sample” of 31 countries from which we have
at least 100 emigrant mothers and fathers. Solid bars in Figure 1 correspond to countries for
which we observe second-generation immigrants, and the black ones identify the “core sample”.
Descriptive statistics for second-generation immigrants on the mother’s side are provided in
Panel A of Table 3.
Figure 2 displays in the left panel the average score of second-generation immigrants against
the average score of natives in the countries of origin of their mothers, pooled across all available
waves. The relationship is positive and tight. While the cross-country variation in natives’
performance reflects a combination of school quality, economic, cultural and institutional factors,
the fact that these gaps are largely preserved across second generation students in other countries
suggests that parents might play an important role. Of course, this pattern might be driven by
factors unrelated to systematic differences in parental influence across countries. We investigate
several potential confounders in our regression analysis.
We amend the notation to take into account the heterogeneity in terms of mothers’ countries
of origin. Let Tmicst denote the PISA math score in year t of child i, studying (and born) in country
20National educational authorities have flexibility on how to classify parents’ country of origin, and most
of them only record separately those parental nationalities that are relatively frequent (grouping the others in
broader categories). We construct a set of countries consistently defined over time; see Appendix A for the
details. Appendix B discusses both the potential issues of unreported countries of origin and misclassification in
the parental immigration status reported by students.
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c and in school s, whose mother was born in country m.21 We estimate variants of the following
specification:
Tmicst “ θ0 ` θ1T
m ` θ12Xicst ` θ
1
3Dicst ` θ4NatFathicst ` θcst ` ε
m
icst (3)
where Tm is the average score of native students in the mother’s country of origin, Xicst andDicst
include the same socio-economic and demographic characteristics considered above, NatFathicst
is a dummy identifying students whose father is a native of country c, θcst is a wave times host-
country (or school, depending on the specification) fixed effect and εmicst is an error term. As
before, by introducing host-country (or school) fixed effects we control for differences in the
characteristics of the institutional context (or specific school) students are exposed to. The
main coefficient of interest is θ1, which captures the relationship between a second-generation
immigrant’s performance and the average score of native students in country m, after having ac-
counted for observable parental characteristics and the quality of the host country’s educational
system.22
Table 4 shows our results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. Standard
errors are clustered at the level of the mother’s country of origin, and inflated by the estimated
measurement error in test scores.23
We proceed by progressively adding controls. Column 1 controls for students’ demographic
characteristics (gender and age in months), fathers’ immigrant status and wave fixed effects
only. The correlation of interest is strong and highly significant: a gap of one (individual-level)
standard deviation in the average score in the mother’s country of origin is reflected in a gap
of 76% of a standard deviation among second generation immigrants.
The coefficient shrinks when we introduce controls for parental observable characteristics
(column 2) and, especially, host-country (column 3) and school (column 4) fixed effects, but is
still positive and significant. A comparison between the first two specifications and columns
3 and 4 suggests that children of immigrant mothers from high PISA countries are located
in countries and schools with conditions more conducive to positive performances. However,
a substantial part of the gap across mothers’ countries of origin persists even conditional on
21The results are similar for the reading and science tests (see Appendix B). Math is often preferred for
international comparisons for the relative easiness of defining and quantifying a common set of expected skills
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2012a).
22We focus on the average score pooled across waves, Tm, because cross-country gaps in performance are quite
stable over time, and the parental factors we investigate are also unlikely to vary dramatically from one wave to
the other. Using the average score of countrym m in wave t as a regressor leads to very similar results, though
we lose all the observations corresponding to second generation immigrants tested in waves where the countries
of origin of their mothers did not participate to PISA.
23As recommended in OECD (2009), each regression is estimated separately for each set of plausible values,
and the sampling variance is computed from the average estimated variance-covariance across these specifications.
In addition, standard errors are corrected for the imputation variance, which is proportional to the variance of
the estimated coefficients across sets of plausible values. In Appendix B we discuss the details of this procedure,
and show that the statistical significance of our results is robust to alternative ways to construct the standard
errors.
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host-country and school characteristics. The last column of Table 4 shows that results are not
driven exclusively by the performances of students with East Asian origins, since the coefficient
is robust to the exclusion of East Asian mothers.24
The right panel of Figure 2 displays the main result of this section. The relationship between
the performance of second-generation immigrants and natives in the mother’s country of origin,
after having controlled for the effect of all observable characteristics, including school fixed
effects, weakens but is still positive and significant.
4.2 Evidence Using US Census Data
We apply a similar specification as in equation (3) to the US Census data. The dependent
variable is a dummy which takes value one if a child has never repeated any grade. This outcome,
while still related to school performance, captures quite a different dimension compared to the
PISA score, given that the variation here comes only from the bottom part of the distribution
(more than 80% of the students in the sample has never repeated a grade, as shown in Table
3) and from students aged 8-15 (while PISA is administered to 15-year-old students only).
The US Census does not include any information on the school children are attending.
To capture some of the differences across educational systems within the US, we control for
Commuting Zone fixed effects.25 Compared to the PISA sample, we can control here for a
richer set of family characteristics, such as number of siblings, parents’ age and family income,
as well as for the number of years passed since the mother has migrated to the US.
Our final sample includes 53,553 second-generation immigrants on the mother’s side and
46,310 on the father’s side, from 64 countries of origin. Descriptive statistics are provided in
Panel B of Table 3.
Table 5 shows our results. Once again, the coefficient on Tm is positive and significant
throughout. Commuting zones fixed effects and controls for parental education, mother’s years
since migration and family income explain about two thirds of the raw gap in performance
between second-generation immigrants from high and low PISA countries. According to col-
umn 4, the most complete specification, an increase of a standard deviation in the PISA score
of students in the mother’s country of origin is associated with a higher probability of not
having repeated any grade by 2.9 percentage points (3% over the average). As for the PISA
specification, the result is robust to the exclusion of East Asian mothers (column 5).
4.3 Selection
As our analysis relies on emigrant parents to make inference on all parents of a given nationality,
a concern is that emigrants are not a random sample of the population, and might be selected
24In Appendix B we show that the estimated relationship is not driven by any single host or origin country.
Moreover, we document that the results are virtually identical when we restrict the sample to host countries with
nearly universal secondary school enrollment, ruling out any important role for early school dropouts in driving
our relationship of interest.
25Commuting Zones are constructed following Autor and Dorn (2013).
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on unobservable characteristics (such as skills and preferences for education) that matter for
children’s school performance.
What type of selection should we worry about? Our quantity of interest is the hypothetical
gap in performance between second-generation immigrants whose parents come from low- and
high-scoring countries, in a world where emigrant parents were randomly selected from their
country of origin’s population. A common degree of selection into emigration across countries
of origin with different PISA scores would not bias our estimate of this object: the effect of such
form of selection would be picked up by the intercept θ0 (or by the host-country or school fixed
effects, if the degree of selection varies across host countries or schools), leaving the coefficient
θ1 unaffected. Patterns of differential selection correlated with the home country’s PISA score
would instead lead to a biased estimate of our coefficient of interest. In particular, our findings
can be rationalized if parents emigrated from countries with high PISA scores are more positively
selected than parents emigrated from countries with low PISA scores.
To understand which case is empirically relevant in our setting, we look at differential
selection in terms of parental education. While the main threat to our approach is differential
selection on unobservables, it seems plausible that several unobservable parental traits that
positively affect children’s school performance (such as skills and attitudes towards schooling)
are positively correlated with parents’ own educational achievements. We can therefore alleviate
the concerns on differential selection if we can show that the relative “quality” of emigrants
compared to stayers is not higher for high PISA countries.26 We construct for each parent a
measure of selection by computing the difference between his or her years of schooling and the
average years of schooling of non-emigrant parents from the same country, and dividing this
quantity by the country-of-origin-specific standard deviation.27
Figure 3 plots the average of this measure across mothers’ countries of origin against the
average score of native students in those countries. For a majority of countries of origin emigrant
mothers are positively selected (that is, our measure is greater than 0), a finding consistent with
most of the recent literature (for example, Feliciano (2005) documents that US immigrants from
most nationalities are positively selected on education). However, the relationship between the
degree of selection and the average PISA score is flat. In Table 6 we further test this result
by regressing the individual-level measure of selection of emigrant parents on the average PISA
score in their country of origin, controlling for country (columns 1 and 3) and school (columns
2 and 4) fixed effects. For both mothers and fathers, the point estimates are negative and not
26Ideally, we would like to perform such an exercise with a measure of quality pre-determined with respect
to migration. Parental education, as any other socio-economic control available in the PISA dataset, does not
satisfy this condition, since parents might have acquired part of their education in their host countries, or have
based their educational choices in their countries of origin anticipating their future relocation. In the Census
data, where information on year of arrival is available, we find similar patterns of selection for those parents that
are more likely to have completed their education in the country of origin (see Appendix C). Moreover, this
potential “contamination” of our proxy for unobservable parental skills is problematic for our purposes only to
the extent that is differential across countries of origin.
27We construct a mapping between the ISCED classification of educational levels and equivalent years of
schooling by using the country-specific conversion table in OECD (2012b). In Appendix C we show that using
either the ratio or the difference between migrant and non-migrant parents’ years of education as alternative
proxies for selection leads to equivalent conclusions.
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statistically significant, suggesting that the type of differential selection that would invalidate
our results is not present neither within host countries nor within schools.
These results are broadly consistent with the patterns of selection reported in the develop-
ment accounting literature. Schoellman (2012) documents that, among migrants (not necessarily
parents of school-age children) residing in the US, the education gap compared to non-migrants
is higher for poor origin countries. Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) show that emigrants from
poor countries are more positively selected in terms of pre-migration wages and occupations.28
An additional concern is that immigrant parents from high PISA countries may be system-
atically selecting host countries where, because of idiosyncratic factors, it is easier for them and
their children to integrate and perform well. We check whether immigrants from high PISA
countries are located in countries which are, according to reasonable proxies, culturally closer
to their country of origin. Table 7 explores this possibility. In column 2 and 4 we add to the
baseline specifications (reported in columns 1 and 3 respectively) controls for linguistic distance
(constructed through the softwares provided by the Automated Similarity Judgment Program
Wichmann and Brown, 2016) and cultural distance (from Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2015); both
measures are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across all country pairs in
the sample. Column 6 includes both proxies simultaneously.
In all cases, our coefficient of interest increases marginally when measures of bilateral dis-
tance are included. The point estimates on these controls are generally positive, and marginally
significant for linguistic distance. One possible interpretation is that linguistic and cultural dis-
tance increase migration costs, and, consistently with the mechanism in Albornoz et al. (2018a)
and the evidence in Albornoz et al. (2018b), generate a more positive selection of emigrant
parents.
5 The Role of Parental Unobservable Characteristics
This section quantifies the role of the unobserved component of parental influence in accounting
for cross-country differences in average test scores. For this purpose, we build on the specification
proposed in Section 3, incorporating second generation immigrants.29
The test score in wave t of student i, educated in school s and country c, whose mother and
father were born in countries m and f is given by
T
mf
icst “ Parents
mf
icst ` EduSystemcst ` µ
1Dicst ` θ
mNatMothmicst ` ζ
fNatFath
f
icst ` ε
mf
icst (4)
28More broadly, our results are consistent with a large literature studying the determinants of emigrants’
self-selection, such as income inequality, migration costs, social networks, geography and school quality. See
Appendix C for a detailed discussion.
29While the linear specification considered here is restrictive, in Appendix E we show that considering different
types of complementarities does not majorly alter our conclusions.
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where NatMothmicst and NatFath
f
icst are dummies identifying native parents (mothers and
fathers, respectively), and Dicst is the same vector of students’ demographic characteristics used
in (1) and (3). As before, we control for EduSystemcst through either wave times country or
wave times school fixed effects.
The Parentsmficst term is once again the combination of the effect of socio-economic and
unobservable characteristics. Crucially, we write the latter as the sum of two parental country
of origin specific unobserved components, γm and δf , and a residual, u˜mficst,
Parents
mf
icst “ ξ
1Xicst ` γ
m ` δf ` u˜mficst
We interpret γm and δf as the average unobservable contributions of, respectively, mothers
born in country m and fathers born in country f . When second generation immigrants are
included, these components can be separately identified from EduSystemcst through mothers’
and fathers’ country-of-origin fixed effects (γm and δf ).
The coefficient θm (and ζf ), in the spirit of a difference in differences, captures the extent
to which the relative performance of students whose mother is from country m, compared to
second-generation immigrant students from another country, is larger or smaller in country m
(where the mother is native) as opposed to a different host country. We allow the “native
advantage” to be country-specific for both mothers and fathers: a failure to do so would imply
that this kind of variation would be absorbed by the country-of-origin fixed effects.
The average performance of native students in country c (pooled across waves) is
Tc “ ξ
1Xc ` γ
c ` δc ` u˜c ` EduSystemc ` ζ
1Dc ` θ
c ` ζc ` αc (5)
We estimate the contribution of unobservable parental characteristics as
{ParentsUnobsc “ pγ
c ` pδc
and quantify its importance for cross-country gaps in average performance through
Covp {ParentsUnobsc, Tcq
VarpTcq
which we benchmark against the corresponding quantity for {ParentsObsc “ pξXc.
Table 8 displays the decomposition results. We show results for two specifications, one where
educational quality is controlled for by host-country fixed effects, and one by school fixed effects.
The contribution of parental unobservables is substantial, ranging between 12% and 16%, and
roughly doubles the overall contribution of parental influence to cross-country differences in
performance.
To better understand the cross-country variation, Table 9 displays estimates for all countries
in the core sample. In particular, columns 3 and 4 show the difference between {ParentsObsc
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and the cross-country mean, while columns 5 and 6 display the corresponding quantities for
{ParentsUnobsc. These figures should be benchmarked against the gap in PISA performance
with respect to the cross-country mean, reported in column 2. For several of the top performing
East Asian countries, unobserved parental characteristics play an important role. For example,
unobservables account for between a quarter and 60% of the gap between the performance of
Hong Kong students and the cross-country average, and for between half and all of the Chinese
outperformance. A low value of {ParentsUnobsc is also a key driver of the low scores in several
Southern European countries. Unobserved parental influence instead does not contribute to
explain the low scores in Brazil and India, the two worst performing countries in the core
sample.30
6 Mechanism
We now study possible mechanisms behind the results. What is it about parents from high PISA
countries that drives the superior school performance of their children? While answering this
question precisely is difficult, we make progress by proceeding in three steps. First, we explore
the heterogeneity of our baseline results with respect to various parental characteristics, and we
discuss how this evidence can shed light on the relative importance of several possible drivers
of cross-country differences in parental influence: the educational system to which parents
were exposed, the country-specific cultural context and the genetic transmission of relevant
traits. Then we turn to time use surveys to see whether immigrant parents from high PISA
countries differ in practices that might help to explain their children’s better performance at
school. Finally, we test whether country-level proxies for economic development, educational
attainment or culture can explain the parental country-of-origin effect.
6.1 Heterogeneity
The documented country-of-origin effect might in principle be driven by a number of sources.
First, the outstanding performance of second-generation immigrants from high PISA countries
might reflect the higher quality of the education received by parents in their country of ori-
gin. This would imply an intergenerational multiplier effect of educational quality, therefore
providing an even stronger rationale for policies aiming to replicate the best practices in this
domain.
An alternative is that the country-of-origin’s cultural context, defined as a shared set of
beliefs and preferences within a given country, might have shaped parents’ attitudes and beliefs
30In Appendix F we discuss how the cross-country variation in the unobserved parental component affects the
relationship between average PISA scores and GDP per capita. We show that that a high parental component is
an important driver of the out-performance of the poorest countries in our sample (China, India and Vietnam)
compared to what one would predict based on their level of development. In a standard development accounting
exercise, the unobservable parental component accounts for a slightly negative share of the cross-country dis-
persion in GDP when all countries are considered, and for a slightly positive share when these 3 countries are
excluded.
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towards education. This variation in cultural traits might have its roots in factors deeply
entrenched in a country’s history and traditions, and improving the educational system might
not do much in raising average test scores if these aspects do not change as well. Yet another
possibility is that individuals from different countries are systematically endowed with different
genetic traits that shape their human capital investment. This interpretation would leave little
room for policies to affect achievement gaps.
To discriminate between these views, we explore the heterogeneity of country-specific parental
influences with respect to parental characteristics. If the intergenerational transmission of ed-
ucational quality is important, we expect the correlation between school performance and the
PISA score in the parents’ country of origin to be particularly strong for students whose parents
acquired more education in their home country, and were therefore more exposed to the home
country’s educational system.31 At the extreme, parents with no education cannot transmit the
quality of their home country’s school system at all.
On the other hand, if what matters is the cultural context in the source country, we expect
the country-of-origin effect to be smaller among parents that are more integrated in their host
country and have at least in part converged to its cultural norms. As cultural assimilation
takes time, the correlation between children’s performance and the average test score in the
country of origin should be weaker for parents that have emigrated many years ago.32 Moreover,
there is evidence that highly educated immigrants have an easier time integrating in their host
country (Lichter and Qian, 2001; Meng and Gregory, 2005); therefore, under the “cultural”
interpretation parental years of schooling might also alleviate the correlation between children’s
performance and the average score in parents’ country of origin.
To summarize, we have testable implications to discriminate between two sources of differ-
ences in parental influence. The intergenerational transmission of educational quality mech-
anism would imply a positive interaction term between parental years of schooling acquired
in the home country and the average score of natives in the same country. A story based on
differences in cultural environments would instead involve a negative interaction between the
average test score and parents’ years since migration, as well as parents’ years of schooling. A
purely genetic view, instead, would not have any obvious implication in terms of differential
effects.
We now turn to the US Census data to put these predictions to empirical scrutiny.33 We
31 We might expect a differential effect of years of schooling in the host country as well, if there are dynamic
complementarities in the human capital accumulation process that make the impact of an additional year of
schooling stronger for parents that have spent the initial part of their educational career in higher quality schools.
Moreover, emigrants from high PISA countries might attend better schools once in the host country.
32There is widespread evidence that years since migration correlate positively with immigrants’ assimilation
(Chiswick, 1978). Children of parents that have spent more time in the US fare better in terms of years of
schooling, earnings (Abramitzky et al., 2016) and school performance (Nielsen and Schindler Rangvid, 2011), a
result that we confirm in our setting (with the caveat that the impact of years since migration is heterogeneous
depending on the country of origin). Appendix D shows that results are similar when we focus on alternative
measures on immigrants’ assimilation.
33We focus on the US Census data because in the PISA sample we do not have information on parents’ year
of immigration, which we need both to compute years since migration and to split parents’ years of schooling in
those accumulated in the home and in the host countries. We report the PISA results on the heterogeneity with
respect to overall parental education in Appendix D.
17
compute mothers’ years of schooling both in their home and in their host countries based
on information on year of immigration and age at the end of education (imputed from the
educational level).34
Table 10 shows the results. We add to the baseline specification in column 1 an interaction
term between Tm and mother’s years of schooling, finding a negative and significant coefficient
(column 2). When we break down years of schooling between those acquired in the US and
those acquired in country m (column 3), we find that the interaction term is negative in both
cases, with coefficients of similar magnitudes. Figure 4 plots the coefficient on Tm for different
levels of mothers’ educational attainment: most of the gap is driven by mothers with either no
education or primary schooling only, and disappears when we focus on mothers with college
education. These results are inconsistent with strong intergenerational effects of educational
quality.35
The study of the heterogeneity with respect to years since migration supports the importance 
of country-specific cultural environments. According to column 4 in Table 10, the correlation 
between T m and children’s school performance is weaker for mothers that have emigrated many 
years ago.36 As shown in Figure 5, the effect of T m disappears for mothers that have spent 
25 years in the US, suggesting that a relatively quick convergence of cultural norms might be 
taking place. Column 5 shows that this pattern (as well as the results on education discussed 
above) is unaffected by the inclusion of controls for age at migration, which has also been shown 
to be important for the assimilation of immigrants (Bleakley and Chin, 2010).
A possible concern is that the imperfect mapping from the information available in the
Census to years of schooling accumulated in country m and in the US might confound our
results. Column 6 in Table 10 shows results for a sub-sample of mothers entirely educated
in their country of origin. The interaction between Tm and mother’s years of schooling is
still negative and significant, and so is the one between Tm and years since migration. The
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are virtually identical to the ones obtained with the
full sample.
34Year of immigration is available as a categorical variable, in intervals of approximately 5 years. We impute
the exact year of arrival in the US according to two alternative criteria: the middle year of each interval for our
baseline results, and the first year for a robustness check where we consider parents likely to have completed their
education in their origin country.
35It is interesting to contrast these results to the ones in Schoellman (2012), who shows that the wage returns
to education of US immigrants are positively related to GDP per capita and PISA scores in their home country
and interprets this as evidence in favor of the fact that school quality varies across countries. While differences
in school quality might be important for immigrants’ labor market outcomes, they do not seem to account for
the differential school performance of their children.
36This result provides an additional reason why our decomposition exercise in Section 5 might understate
the importance of parental influence. If immigrant parents from different countries progressively become more
similar to each other as they integrate in their host country, we would find a larger role for parental influence by
focusing on those who have just emigrated, which are still very comparable to non-emigrants in their country of
origin. Unfortunately, date of immigration is not available in the PISA data.
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Overall, our results are supportive of an interpretation based on country-specific cultural
environments. While we cannot entirely rule out a role for genetic traits, the fact that gaps
in performance disappear when focusing on more educated and integrated parents is difficult
rationalize with a purely genetic transmission story.
6.2 Time Use
In this section we investigate whether immigrant parents from high PISA countries allocate more
time to activities that might plausibly stimulate their children’s human capital accumulation.
The analysis complements and extends the work of Ramey (2011), who compares time use
practices across ethnic groups.
Table 11 shows our results. Columns 1 to 3 refer to total child care, while columns 4 to
6 break down the time spent with children in the educational, recreative and basic categories.
Across all specifications and time use categories, interviewed parents from high PISA countries
stand out for spending more time with their children. The result is robust to the inclusion
of state fixed effects and several controls on demographic and socio-economic characteristics of
both parents and children. Since time use variables are measured in minutes and refer to a single
day, from column 3 it emerges that an increase of one (individual-level) standard deviation in the
PISA score in a parent’s country of origin corresponds to a higher investment of approximately
84 minutes per week in total child care. This extra child care time is quite evenly spread across
the three time use subcategories, even though as a proportion of the mean the largest gap is in
educational activities.37
These results indicate that immigrant parents do differ in terms of observable practices as
a function of their country of origin and this may lay behind the results found in the previous
sections.
6.3 Country-Level Characteristics
We now augment specification (3) with a series of controls at the mother’s country-of-origin-
level. The objective is to understand which country-level characteristics drive, at least in part,
the difference in performance between second generation immigrants from high- and low-scoring
countries.
Table 12 includes controls related to economic development and schooling in country m.38
As high-scoring countries in the PISA test are richer and have more educated populations, we
want to check whether this gives to second-generation immigrants from those countries some
direct advantage which might explain their superior performance. In column 2 we add to the
37We find again that the effect is mostly concentrated among low educated parents and those of more recent
immigration. These results are available upon request.
38We use real GDP per capita from the Penn Word Tables 8.0, average years of schooling for 35- to 45-year-
old adults in 2010 from Barro and Lee (2013), and cumulative expenditure per pupil in secondary schools from
various sources described in Appendix A.
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baseline specification in column 1 log real GDP per capita in the mother’s country of origin; the
coefficient is actually negative and statistically significant. Average years of schooling in the
mother’s country of origin, included in column 3, is not related to the performance of second
generation immigrants. Column 4 further controls for the cumulative expenditure per pupil in
secondary schools. While the coefficient is negative, this is driven by the correlation between
expenditure and GDP per capita; indeed, in a specification that includes all these controls
simultaneously (column 5), expenditure is positively related to second generation immigrants’
performance, while GDP has a stronger negative effect.
The negative correlation (conditional on other covariates) between GDP in country m and
the performance of second generation immigrants whose mothers come from m is somewhat
surprising. One should keep in mind that the regression controls for Tm, strongly correlated
with GDP in country m, so that the estimated coefficient quantifies the effect of that part
of GDP in country m not already reflected in the PISA score in country m (if we drop Tm
from the specification, the coefficient on GDP becomes small and not significantly different
from zero). A possible interpretation is that this might be driven by differential selection into
migration: if a lower GDP per capita implies higher migration costs, then parents migrating
from poorer countries should be more positively selected (once again, consistently with the
mechanism in Albornoz et al., 2018a and the evidence in Albornoz et al., 2018b). Whatever
the underlying mechanism, Table 12 suggests that controlling for more proxies for economic
and educational development of country m does not weaken the association between second
generation immigrants’ performance and the PISA score in country m; if anything, it makes it
stronger.
Table 13 controls for proxies for various cultural traits from the World Value Survey. While,
to our knowledge, a direct measure of attitudes towards education is not available, we focus
on three proxies that have been studied elsewhere as determinants of labor supply and effort:
tastes for leisure, locus of control and long-term orientation.39,40
Columns 1 to 3 introduce our cultural proxies in regressions controlling for the usual parental
characteristics and school fixed effects. All three coefficients are of the expected sign; second-
generation immigrants from countries where leisure is considered less important, where people
believe to have control on events in their life and are oriented towards the future score better
39Among others, Moriconi and Peri (2015) study country-specific preferences for leisure and labor supply
choices, Coleman and DeLeire (2003) estimate the effect of the locus of control on educational and labor market
outcomes while Dohmen et al. (2016), Galor and O¨mer O¨zak (2016) and Figlio et al. (2016) consider how long
term orientation shapes human capital investment.
40Tastes for leisure are measured from the question how important leisure time is in your life?. Answers
(ranging from 1 to 4) are standardized to take mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at the individual level. The
locus of control is measured from the question how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over
the way your life turns out?, where answers are standardized as above. All variables are country-level averages
across all available waves. The measure of long term orientation was developed by Hofstede (1991) and updated
in Hofstede et al. (2010) using data from the World Value Survey; it ranges from 0 to 1.
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than their peers, even if school quality is controlled for. A similar message emerges when the
cultural proxies are included simultaneously (column 4). In column 6 we further control for
the average performance of native students in the mother’s country of origin, which retains
its statistical significance and drops somewhat compared to the baseline specification without
cultural proxies (reported in column 5).
Proxies for cultural traits in the parental countries of origin can go some way towards
explaining the parental country-of-origin effect across second-generation immigrants. Much of
this variation, however, remains unexplained, suggesting perhaps that the attitudes or traits
underlying educational performance might not entirely captured by the observable proxies for
culture commonly used in the literature.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that the importance of parents in explaining cross-country achievement gaps
goes well beyond what could be inferred by only considering parental socio-economic character-
istics. We show that a relevant share of the international variation in test scores is accounted
for by parental factors beyond education, income and labour market status. We arrive to this
conclusion through an indirect empirical approach, based on the comparison of the school per-
formance of second-generation immigrants, studying in the same country or even in the same
school, with parents of different nationalities.
Cross-country differences in unobserved parental characteristics, inferred from achievement
gaps between second generation immigrants, account for about 15% of the cross-country vari-
ance in test scores, roughly doubling the overall contribution of parental influence. For what
concerns the sources of this result, we do not find evidence for a mechanism of intergenerational
transmission of school quality, as parental education appears to attenuate rather than reinforce
the magnitude of the inferred unobserved component. Our results seem to support instead the
importance of cultural factors, varying across countries, that shape parents’ attitudes towards
their children’s education. Moreover, differences in parental influence across nationalities are
partially reflected in observable time use practices.
These results have implications for the study of human capital in a cross-country perspec-
tive. Models of human capital accumulation should be consistent with an important role for
parents in the transmission of knowledge, beyond what can be inferred by the empirical effect of
socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, parental influence potentially represents a competing
mechanism to gaps in TFP and local economic conditions for generating human capital and
output gaps across countries. A systematic quantitative analysis of the interaction between
these factors is a promising avenue for future work.
Our conclusions moreover naturally lead to interesting questions on cross-country differences
in parental attitudes towards education. If those attitudes are important determinants of human
capital achievement, it is crucial to understand how they form and evolve, and why they do
so differently across time and space. Historical circumstances experienced in different countries
might have played an important role, and social interactions between people of various origins
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(brought about by migration or trade linkages) might have shaped the diffusion of different
cultural traits.
Finally, our results are relevant for policy-makers aiming to raise their students’ performance
in standardized tests. Cross-country gaps go beyond differences in school quality and parents’
socio-economic background, and policies aimed at simply replicating school practices successful
in other countries might have smaller-than-expected effects.
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Tables
Table 1: Educational Production Function Estimation - PISA
Dependent Variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Parental Socio-Economic Background
Father Sec Edu 0.151*** 0.033** 0.053*** 0.086*** 0.012 0.017**
(0.038) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007)
Father Ter Edu 0.211*** 0.106*** 0.113*** 0.139*** 0.017 0.020**
(0.045) (0.023) (0.020) (0.011) (0.017) (0.010)
Mother Sec Edu 0.198*** 0.034 0.059*** 0.090*** -0.001 0.002
(0.045) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Mother Ter Edu 0.244*** 0.069** 0.097*** 0.119*** 0.000 -0.003
(0.052) (0.030) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Mother Working ˆ Mother ISEI 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Father Working ˆ Father ISEI 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Different Lang at Home -0.289*** -0.132* -0.005 -0.024 0.027 0.019
(0.066) (0.072) (0.052) (0.044) (0.036) (0.037)
11-25 Books 0.105* 0.082** 0.093** 0.090*** 0.047 0.041*
(0.059) (0.041) (0.037) (0.027) (0.032) (0.022)
26-100 Books 0.423*** 0.286*** 0.278*** 0.286*** 0.158*** 0.157***
(0.086) (0.058) (0.051) (0.032) (0.048) (0.030)
101-200 Books 0.626*** 0.419*** 0.409*** 0.416*** 0.242*** 0.239***
(0.095) (0.069) (0.062) (0.044) (0.059) (0.044)
201-500 Books 0.863*** 0.610*** 0.591*** 0.593*** 0.386*** 0.371***
(0.101) (0.071) (0.067) (0.051) (0.071) (0.054)
500+ Books 0.836*** 0.597*** 0.585*** 0.565*** 0.403*** 0.362***
(0.120) (0.096) (0.091) (0.067) (0.084) (0.063)
Educational System Resources & Institutions
Expenditure per Student 0.045***
(0.006)
Avg Share Gov Funding -0.518***
(0.195)
Share Private 0.154
(0.192)
External Exit Exams 0.220***
(0.062)
Some Shortage Material -0.093***
(0.014)
Large Shortage Material -0.163***
(0.024)
Assessment for Retention 0.025
(0.026)
Assessment to Group Students -0.024
(0.021)
Assessment for School Comparison -0.012
(0.028)
Share Certified Teachers (F.T.) 0.024
(0.055)
Share Certified Teachers (P.T.) 0.033
(0.024)
Teacher Monitor - Principal -0.024
(0.035)
Teacher Monitor - Inspector -0.053*
(0.028)
Autonomy - Hiring 0.060
(0.037)
27
Autonomy - Salary -0.102***
(0.031)
Autonomy - Budget 0.036
(0.027)
Autonomy - Content -0.008
(0.026)
N 411213 411213 411213 1381823 411213 1381823
# Country 37 37 37 79 37 79
R Squared 0.35 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.62 0.62
Host Country ˆ Wave FE No No Yes Yes No No
School ˆ Wave FE No No No No Yes Yes
Sample Edu Obs Edu Obs Edu Obs All Edu Obs All
Notes: The Table shows results for native students. All specifications control for intercept, students’ age (in
months), gender, wave fixed effect and dummies for parents’ employment status (full-time employed, part-
time employed, not working). Working refers to either full-time or part-time employed. Sample indicates
the sample inclusion criteria: Edu Obs refers to countries where the educational system controls displayed in
column 2 are available, while All refers to all countries. Observations are weighted according to the provided
sample weights. Standard errors are clustered by host country, and inflated by the estimated measurement
error in test scores. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Table 2: Baseline Decomposition Results
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Covp {ParentsObsc,Tcq
VarpTcq
42.62 26.36 25.10 16.18 12.70 8.89
# Country 37 37 37 79 37 79
School Controls No Yes No No No No
Host Country ˆ Wave FE No No Yes Yes No No
School ˆ Wave FE No No No No Yes Yes
Sample Edu Obs Edu Obs Edu Obs All Edu Obs All
Notes: The Table shows decomposition results for native students. {ParentsObsc is the effect of observable
parental characteristics estimated from the corresponding specification in Table 1. Sample indicates the
sample inclusion criteria: Edu Obs refers to countries where the educational system controls displayed in
column 2 of Table 1 are available, while All refers to all countries.
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Table 3: Summary statistics - Second Generation Immigrants on the Mother’s Side
Panel A: All Score Country m Score Country m
PISA Sample Below Median Above Median
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Score 0.39 0.88 0.22 0.84 0.76 0.87
Score Country m 0.24 0.38 0.05 0.32 0.64 0.11
Mother Sec Edu 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.50
Mother Ter Edu 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.44
Father Sec Edu 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.50
Father Ter Edu 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.28 0.45
Mother Working 0.71 0.45 0.73 0.45 0.67 0.47
Working Mother ISEI 42.29 19.94 42.18 20.28 42.56 19.10
Father Working 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.29
Working Father ISEI 42.03 18.69 41.96 18.70 42.18 18.65
Different Lang at Home 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.15 0.36
Books at Home 139.19 194.28 140.72 195.96 135.83 190.51
Immigrant Father 0.62 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.56 0.50
Observations 49097 24581 24516
Panel B: All Score Country m Score Country m
US Census Sample Below Median Above Median
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
No Grade Repeated 0.81 0.39 0.77 0.42 0.85 0.35
Score Country m 0.20 0.48 -0.14 0.40 0.60 0.11
Mother Sec Edu 0.48 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.58 0.49
Mother Ter Edu 0.21 0.40 0.15 0.36 0.27 0.44
Father Sec Edu 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.44 0.50
Father Ter Edu 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.42 0.49
Log Family Income 10.84 0.70 10.71 0.73 10.98 0.63
Father Immigrant 0.46 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.35 0.48
Yrs Since Migr Mother 20.06 8.74 19.26 8.74 20.97 8.65
Student Age 11.34 2.29 11.23 2.28 11.47 2.29
Observations 53553 30814 22739
Notes: The Table shows descriptive statistics for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side in the
PISA (Panel A) and US Census (Panel B) samples. Only cases where both parents report a country of origin
and the country of origin of the mother participates to PISA are included. Scores are from the math test
and are standardized to have mean 0 and (individual-level) standard deviation 1 across the (pooled, equally
weighted) countries participating to the test. Books at Home is constructed imputing the middle value of
the available categorical variables (and 750 for the 500+ category). Observations weighted according to the
provided sample weights.
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Table 4: Reduced Form Results on Second Generation Immigrants - PISA
Dependent Variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
All No East Asia
Score Country m 0.755*** 0.628*** 0.271** 0.225*** 0.174**
(0.208) (0.223) (0.119) (0.072) (0.082)
Female -0.116*** -0.145*** -0.155*** -0.200*** -0.186***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
Father Sec Edu 0.015 0.027 0.028 0.053
(0.045) (0.027) (0.021) (0.037)
Father Ter Edu -0.044 0.051 0.019 0.034
(0.055) (0.038) (0.028) (0.046)
Mother Sec Edu 0.033 0.064* -0.038 -0.007
(0.058) (0.037) (0.032) (0.065)
Mother Ter Edu -0.071 0.081** -0.035 -0.012
(0.076) (0.039) (0.033) (0.064)
Mother Working ˆ Mother ISEI 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father Working ˆ Father ISEI 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Different Lang at Home -0.131** -0.081* -0.066** -0.056**
(0.066) (0.045) (0.029) (0.028)
11-25 Books 0.124** 0.139*** 0.092*** 0.116***
(0.051) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028)
26-100 Books 0.398*** 0.359*** 0.201*** 0.242***
(0.050) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
101-200 Books 0.519*** 0.487*** 0.260*** 0.302***
(0.061) (0.039) (0.044) (0.048)
201-500 Books 0.726*** 0.661*** 0.392*** 0.453***
(0.080) (0.059) (0.063) (0.069)
500+ Books 0.677*** 0.613*** 0.404*** 0.465***
(0.077) (0.046) (0.072) (0.075)
N 49097 49097 49097 49097 31347
# Country m 59 59 59 59 52
R Squared 0.10 0.23 0.34 0.66 0.62
Host Country ˆ Wave FE No No Yes Yes Yes
School ˆ Wave FE No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. The sample includes
only cases where both parents report a country of origin and the country of origin of the mother participates
to PISA. Score Country m is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1 across all countries participating to the test) in the country of birth of the mother,
across all available waves. All specifications control for intercept, students’ age (in months), wave fixed effect
and a dummy for father’s immigrant status; specifications 2-5 additionally control for dummies for parents’
employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, not working). Working refers to either full-time
or part-time employed. Observations are weighted according to the provided sample weights. Standard errors
are clustered by mother’s country of origin, and inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores.
* denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 5: Reduced Form Results on Second Generation Immigrants - US CENSUS
Dependent variable: 1 = Never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
All No East Asia
Score Country m 0.094*** 0.050*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.023**
(0.031) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Female 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.071***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother Sec Edu 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.042***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Mother Ter Edu 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Father Sec Edu 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.045***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Father Ter Edu 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.068***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Log Family Income 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
N 53553 53553 53553 53553 49634
# Country m 64 64 64 64 57
R Squared 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.12
Comm Zone FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Years Since Migr Mother No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. Score Country m
is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across
all countries participating to the test) in the country of birth of the mother. All specifications control for
intercept, child age dummies, parents’ age, number of siblings, year fixed effect, (year specific) quarter of birth
fixed effect and father’s immigrant status. Observations weighted according to the provided sample weights.
Robust standard errors clustered by mother’s country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, ***
at 1%.
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Table 6: Selection
Dependent Variable:
Standardized Years of Education
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Mothers Fathers
Score Country m -0.003 -0.083
(0.217) (0.197)
Score Country f 0.017 -0.135
(0.204) (0.164)
N 49097 49097 48834 48834
R Squared 0.07 0.61 0.07 0.59
Host Country ˆ Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ˆ Wave FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: The sample includes emigrant mothers (columns 1 and 2) and fathers (3 and 4). The dependent
variable is years of education standardized by the average and standard deviation of mothers’ (columns 1
and 2) and fathers’ (3 and 4) education in the country of origin. Score Country m and Score Country f are
the average math PISA scores of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across all
countries participating to the test) in the country of birth of the mother and the father. All specifications
control for intercept and wave fixed effect. Standard errors clustered by mother’s (columns 1 and 2) and
father’s (3 and 4) country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 7: Linguistic and Cultural Distance
Dependent Variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Score Country m 0.247*** 0.277*** 0.229** 0.287*** 0.249** 0.309***
(0.075) (0.071) (0.096) (0.103) (0.099) (0.101)
Female -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.193***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Father Sec Edu 0.024 0.025 0.051 0.052 0.042 0.043
(0.021) (0.021) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Father Ter Edu 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.006
(0.028) (0.028) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Mother Sec Edu -0.034 -0.034 -0.031 -0.026 -0.023 -0.018
(0.035) (0.036) (0.064) (0.068) (0.066) (0.071)
Mother Ter Edu -0.032 -0.030 -0.045 -0.037 -0.036 -0.028
(0.033) (0.033) (0.061) (0.066) (0.064) (0.069)
Mother Working ˆ Mother ISEI 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father Working ˆ Father ISEI 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Different Lang at Home -0.070** -0.082*** -0.073** -0.085*** -0.077** -0.096***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.027) (0.033) (0.025)
11-25 Books 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.132***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035)
26-100 Books 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.226*** 0.224*** 0.233*** 0.232***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051)
101-200 Books 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.283*** 0.282*** 0.294*** 0.295***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053)
201-500 Books 0.387*** 0.390*** 0.447*** 0.448*** 0.454*** 0.460***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080)
500+ Books 0.404*** 0.411*** 0.441*** 0.444*** 0.450*** 0.458***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.091) (0.094) (0.091) (0.094)
Mother Linguistic Distance 0.018* 0.005
(0.009) (0.018)
Father Linguistic Distance 0.017* 0.025
(0.009) (0.016)
Mother Cultural Distance 0.035 0.039
(0.024) (0.033)
Father Cultural Distance 0.009 -0.016
(0.026) (0.032)
N 46896 46896 23513 23513 23331 23331
# Country m 57 57 42 42 41 41
R Squared 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Host Country ˆ Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ˆ Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side, augmented for controls
for linguistic and cultural distance. Sample includes only cases where both parents report a country of
origin and the country of origin of the mother participates to PISA. All specifications control for intercept,
students’ age (in months), wave fixed effect, a dummy for father’s immigrant status and dummies for parents’
employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, not working). Working refers to either full-
time or part-time employed. Linguistic Distance and Cultural Distance vary at the country-pair level, and
are standardized to take mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across all pairs in the sample. Observations are
weighted according to the provided sample weights. Standard errors are clustered by mother’s country of
origin, and inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at
5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 8: Decomposition Results with Parental Unobservables
[1] [2]
Covp {ParentsObsc,Tcq
VarpTcq
21.21 10.64
Covp {ParentsUnobsc,Tcq
VarpTcq
15.86 11.57
# Country 31 31
Host Country ˆ Wave FE Yes No
School ˆ Wave FE No Yes
Sample Sec Gen Sec Gen
Notes: The Table shows decomposition results for native students, using second generation immigrants to
estimate parental unobservables. Only countries with at least 100 emigrant mothers and 100 emigrant fathers
in the sample are included in the computation. {ParentsObsc and {ParentsUnbsc are the effects of observable
and unobservable parental characteristics. Sample indicates the sample inclusion criteria: Sec Gen refers to
countries from which we observe emigrant parents.
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Table 9: Decomposition Results - Countries
{ParentsObsc Gap {ParentsUnobsc Gap
Country PISA Score PISA Gap School FE Country FE School FE Country FE
Hong Kong 1 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.43
(0.00) (0.03) (0.15) (0.16)
Belgium 0.85 0.57 0.05 0.13 -0.02 -0.12
(0.00) (0.03) (0.33) (0.29)
China 0.82 0.54 -0.04 -0.09 0.25 0.62
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Netherlands 0.79 0.51 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.12
(0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11)
Germany 0.72 0.44 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.11
(0.00) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08)
Macao 0.65 0.37 -0.04 -0.10 0.19 0.47
(0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11)
New Zealand 0.63 0.35 0.08 0.15 -0.12 -0.19
(0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Denmark 0.59 0.31 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.07
(0.00) (0.03) (0.15) (0.14)
France 0.59 0.31 0.05 0.11 -0.06 -0.23
(0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
Austria 0.57 0.29 0.05 0.12 0.04 -0.07
(0.00) (0.03) (0.12) (0.12)
Australia 0.54 0.26 0.09 0.17 -0.19 -0.17
(0.00) (0.03) (0.15) (0.13)
Czech Republic 0.53 0.25 0.06 0.11 0.01 -0.02
(0.00) (0.03) (0.11) (0.12)
Sweden 0.52 0.24 0.10 0.21 0.08 -0.04
(0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
United Kingdom 0.49 0.21 0.06 0.12 -0.05 -0.12
(0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Vietnam 0.44 0.16 -0.14 -0.31 0.29 0.49
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
Poland 0.42 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10
(0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08)
Slovakia 0.37 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.08
(0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09)
United States 0.35 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.12
(0.00) (0.03) (0.10) (0.12)
Spain 0.33 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.11
(0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.10)
Italy 0.27 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.18 -0.33
(0.00) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09)
Portugal 0.27 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Russia 0.22 -0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.08
(0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Croatia 0.13 -0.15 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.04
(0.00) (0.03) (0.13) (0.13)
Greece 0.06 -0.22 0.02 0.05 -0.30 -0.30
(0.00) (0.03) (0.16) (0.17)
Serbia-Mont. -0.15 -0.43 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.14
(0.00) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
Turkey -0.17 -0.45 -0.10 -0.25 -0.22 -0.35
(0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09)
Lebanon -0.38 -0.66 0.01 0.00 -0.31 -0.42
(0.01) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09)
Continued on next page
35
Continued from previous page
{ParentsObsc Gap {ParentsUnobsc Gap
Country PISA Score PISA Gap School FE Country FE School FE Country FE
Albania -0.61 -0.89 -0.12 -0.22 -0.09 -0.07
(0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
Jordan -0.62 -0.90 -0.09 -0.15 -0.10 -0.18
(0.00) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08)
Brazil -0.65 -0.93 -0.13 -0.26 0.17 0.28
(0.00) (0.03) (0.14) (0.13)
India -0.89 -1.17 -0.17 -0.36 0.05 0.10
(0.01) (0.03) (0.10) (0.12)
Notes: The Table shows the decomposition results across countries. Only countries with at least 100 emigrant
mothers and 100 emigrant fathers in the sample are shown. PISA Gap, {ParentsObsc Gap and {ParentsUnobsc
Gap are the differences between the country-specific value and the cross-country average of the average PISA
score for the native students included in the decomposition exercise, the estimated effect of observable parental
characteristics and the estimated effect of unobservable parental characteristics.
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Table 10: Interactions - US CENSUS
Dependent variable: 1 = Never repeated a grade
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Mothers
All Educated
in m
Score Country m 0.032*** 0.101*** 0.138*** 0.200*** 0.190*** 0.201***
(0.008) (0.030) (0.046) (0.050) (0.061) (0.057)
Female 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Yrs Schooling Father 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Schooling Mother 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Score Country m ˆ Yrs Schooling Mother -0.006***
(0.002)
Score Country m ˆ Yrs Schooling Moth in US -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Score Country m ˆ Yrs Schooling Moth in m -0.006** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Yrs Schooling Moth in US 0.007*** 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Yrs Schooling Moth in m 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Yrs Since Migr Mother 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Score Country m ˆ Yrs Since Migr Mother -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Migration Moth -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Score Country m ˆ Age Migration Moth 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
N 53553 53553 53553 53553 53553 30300
# Country m 64 64 64 64 64 64
R Squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14
Comm Zone FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. Score Country m
is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across
all countries participating to the test) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. All
specifications control for intercept, child age dummies, parents’ age, number of siblings, log family income,
year fixed effect, (year-specific) quarter of birth fixed effect and father’s immigrant status. Observations are
weighted according to the provided sample weights. Standard errors are clustered by mother’s country of
origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 11: Time Use of Parents
Total Total Total Educational Recreational Basic
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Score Country p 17.557* 17.009** 11.966*** 3.118** 5.866** 2.982
(10.070) (8.342) (4.258) (1.333) (2.271) (2.046)
Mother 66.230*** 8.480*** 1.090 56.660***
(3.854) (0.870) (3.192) (2.434)
Parent Sec Edu -1.702 4.631*** -2.945 -3.389
(6.002) (0.764) (3.170) (2.638)
Parent Ter Edu 4.220 4.100*** -1.999 2.119
(3.586) (1.297) (2.288) (1.850)
Spouse Sec Edu 3.242 -1.869** 6.188** -1.077
(2.912) (0.813) (2.832) (1.225)
Spouse Ter Edu 12.816*** 2.022 6.736** 4.059
(3.388) (1.517) (2.655) (3.016)
Log Family Income 5.731** 0.706 -1.356 6.381***
(2.248) (0.639) (0.974) (1.349)
Age Parent 0.229 0.105 0.085 0.039
(0.361) (0.071) (0.337) (0.196)
Age Spouse 0.388 0.152* 0.003 0.232
(0.249) (0.091) (0.196) (0.269)
Number of Children 20.089*** 3.473** 1.071 15.545***
(2.738) (1.363) (0.664) (1.558)
Avg Age Children -8.908*** -0.276* -3.311*** -5.322***
(1.029) (0.139) (0.413) (0.570)
Number of Male Children -1.178 0.821 -0.916 -1.083
(1.631) (0.533) (1.034) (1.002)
Yrs Since Migration -0.184 -0.139*** -0.125 0.080
(0.201) (0.035) (0.131) (0.101)
N 5812 5812 5812 5812 5812 5812
# Country p 64 64 64 64 64 64
Mean Dep. Var. 89.33 89.33 89.33 10.54 22.03 56.75
St. Dev. Dep. Var. 119.61 119.61 119.61 32.25 57.91 88.36
R Squared 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.06 0.10 0.22
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes only immigrant parents of children of at most 18 years. Parent refers to the
interviewed parent, Spouse to the other one; Mother is 1 when the interviewed parent is the mother. Total
refers to the total time spent in child care activities, while Educational, Recreational and Basic refer to the
sub-categories defined in the text. Score Country p is the average math PISA score of natives (standardized to
have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across all countries participating to the test) in the country of birth of
the interviewed parent, across all available waves. Additional controls in specifications (3) to (6) are dummies
for native spouses and for retired, full time students and disabled parents. Standard errors are clustered by
the interviewed parent’s country of origin. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 12: Country of Origin Characteristics - Economic and Educational Development
Dependent variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Score Country m 0.228*** 0.327*** 0.226*** 0.279*** 0.301***
(0.073) (0.066) (0.081) (0.077) (0.062)
Female -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.200***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Father Sec Edu 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.018
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Father Ter Edu 0.011 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.006
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Mother Sec Edu -0.036 -0.038 -0.036 -0.036 -0.044
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
Mother Ter Edu -0.034 -0.035 -0.034 -0.032 -0.044
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
Mother Working ˆ Mother ISEI 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father Working ˆ Father ISEI 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Different Lang at Home -0.075*** -0.085*** -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.082***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
11-25 Books 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.102***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
26-100 Books 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.209***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
101-200 Books 0.264*** 0.266*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.268***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
201-500 Books 0.395*** 0.401*** 0.395*** 0.397*** 0.403***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065)
500+ Books 0.407*** 0.413*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.415***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075)
Log GDP in m -0.113*** -0.185***
(0.033) (0.040)
Avg Years Edu in m 0.000 0.010
(0.012) (0.007)
Expenditure per Student in m -0.006** 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
N 48671 48671 48671 48671 48671
# Country m 53 53 53 53 53
R Squared 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
Host Country ˆ Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ˆ Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. Score Country m is the
average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across all countries
participating to the test) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. All specifications
control for intercept, students’ age (in months), wave fixed effect, a dummy for father’s immigrant status and
dummies for parents’ employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, not working). Working
refers to either full-time or part-time employed. Log GDP in m, Avg Years Edu in m and Expenditure per
Student in m are respectively the wave-specific contemporaneous log real GDP per capita, the average years
of schooling in 2010 of 35- to 45-year-old adults and the cumulative expenditure per pupil in secondary schools
in the country of birth of the mother. Observations are weighted according to the provided sample weights.
Standard errors are clustered by mother’s country of origin, and inflated by the estimated measurement error
in test scores. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table 13: Country of Origin Characteristics - Cultural Traits
Dependent variable: Math Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Score Country m 0.214*** 0.158***
(0.068) (0.056)
Female -0.198*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.198*** -0.200*** -0.198***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Father Sec Edu 0.025 0.023 0.025 0.022 0.028 0.025
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Father Ter Edu 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.016 0.010
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
Mother Sec Edu -0.031 -0.036 -0.033 -0.041 -0.040 -0.044
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Mother Ter Edu -0.029 -0.035 -0.032 -0.044 -0.038 -0.045
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Mother Working ˆ Mother ISEI 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father Working ˆ Father ISEI 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Different Lang at Home -0.087*** -0.078*** -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.072** -0.079***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
11-25 Books 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.096*** 0.098***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
26-100 Books 0.209*** 0.215*** 0.209*** 0.211*** 0.206*** 0.207***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
101-200 Books 0.267*** 0.270*** 0.265*** 0.268*** 0.261*** 0.263***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045)
201-500 Books 0.408*** 0.407*** 0.402*** 0.408*** 0.395*** 0.403***
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064)
500+ Books 0.416*** 0.418*** 0.410*** 0.420*** 0.406*** 0.415***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Leisure Important in Life -0.232*** -0.260*** -0.303***
(0.074) (0.054) (0.061)
Locus of Control 0.320*** 0.438*** 0.289***
(0.116) (0.081) (0.099)
Long Term Orientation 0.247 0.218* 0.073
(0.151) (0.113) (0.125)
N 48499 48499 48499 48499 48499 48499
# Country m 53 53 53 53 53 53
R Squared 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Host Country ˆ Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School ˆ Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The Table shows results for second generation immigrants on the mother’s side. Score Country m is the
average math PISA score of natives (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 across all countries
participating to the test) in the country of birth of the mother, across all available waves. All specifications
control for intercept, students’ age (in months), wave fixed effect, a dummy for father’s immigrant status and
dummies for parents’ employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, not working). Working
refers to either full-time or part-time employed. Leisure Important in m and Locus of Control in m are
constructed from answers of natives in the mother’s country of birth to questions in the World Value Survey
(described in the text), and are standardized to take mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the WVS sample.
Long Term Orientation in m is from Hofstede et al. (2010) and ranges from 0 to 1. Observations are weighted
according to the provided sample weights. Standard errors are clustered by mother’s country of origin, and
inflated by the estimated measurement error in test scores. * denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at
1%.
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Figures
Figure 1: Performance of Native Students across Countries
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Notes: The height of the bar represents the average PISA score in mathematics for native students. Scores are
standardized to have mean 0 and (individual-level) standard deviation 1 across the (pooled, equally weighted)
countries participating to at least one wave of the test. Black bars refer to countries in the core sample, grey bars
to countries for which we observe at least one second generation immigrant but less than 100 immigrant mothers
and/or fathers.
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Figure 2: Performance of Second Generation Immigrants and Natives
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Notes: The left panel plots the average PISA score of second generation immigrants whose mother is from
country m against the average math PISA score of natives in country m, for all countries with at least 100 second
generation immigrants on the mother’s side in the sample. The right panel plots the predicted scores from a
regression with individual math scores as dependent variable and fixed effects for mother’s country of origin,
school fixed effects and all the other controls included in column 4 of Table 4, with all covariates except country
of origin fixed effects set at their sample mean and the sample restricted to second generation immigrants on
the mother’s side. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of second generation immigrants on the
mother’s side in the sample. The line shows the best (weighted) linear fit.
Figure 3: Selection on Parental Education
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Notes: The Figure plots the average years of schooling of emigrant mothers from country m stan-
dardized by the average and the standard deviation of years of schooling of non-emigrant mothers
in country m (y-axis) against the average PISA score of native students in country m (x-axis). The
sizes of the circles are proportional to the number of emigrant mothers in the sample. The line
shows the best (weighted) linear fit.
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous Effect with respect to Mother’s Education - US Census
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Notes: The Figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the interactions
between the average PISA score of natives in mother’s country of origin and dummies corresponding
to mother’s educational achievement, with the dependent variable and other controls being the same
as in column 4 of Table 5. Standard errors are clustered by mother’s country of origin.
Figure 5: Heterogeneous Effect with respect to Mother’s Years Since Migration - US Census
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Notes: The Figure plots the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals on the interactions
between the average PISA score of natives in mother’s country of origin and dummies corresponding
to mother’s years since migration, with the dependent variable and other controls being the same
as in column 4 of Table 5. Standard errors are clustered by mother’s country of origin.
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